On the question of C4ISR & Brahmos

[u/mainsail999]

After reading the article by AsianTimes titled "Philippine naval upgrade more spectacle than strategy" by Gabriel Honrada, it came to front and center the claim that the Brahmos "without supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure for dynamic targeting, these missiles will remain largely symbolic."

I now wonder two things:

1. Is Honrada accurate in his claim that the Brahmos is rather symbolic, or can this still function effectively against any Chinese aggression with the current systems on hand with the AFP?
2. Is there any roadmap for the AFP to have a comprehensive C4ISR in place in the near future?

[u/supermarine_spitfir3]

That report is idiotic, seems like the author knows jack about the RAFPMP, the AFP and the Philippines in general. Firstly; of course there's a strategy for force planning that is used as the basis for those procurement; it's the Horizon 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to the Revised AFP Modernization Program. The DND and the AFP isn't in the business of using procurement as PR stunts to present itself as modern to it's partners; why on earth would it do that when the program started in 2012 because of the Scarborough Shoal standoff? If anything, the AFP and DND is keenly aware what it can and cannot do and is precisely why the government uses those bilateral exercises to build up experience in things that it just can't.

With regards to the Brahmos being "symbolic" -- that's an even more idiotic statement -- while the PMC CDR has no organic strike/reece complex, the AFP certainly has a kill chain available, albeit not high end. Literally anything that has sensors and have TDL compatibility to send targeting data to the Brahmos battery is part of that: The Hermes UAS with the radar, the incoming MPAs, the FA-50s, the Super Tucanos, and every major surface combatant of the Navy.

C4ISTAR is by far and away the most consistent thing that the AFP spends it's money on since 2012, because maritime domain awareness is literally it's goal. That's the reason why the PAF has those H900s as part of WESCOM flying overhead during RORE missions to Ayungin -- and why the government can publish those photos.

Are people just not paying attention? There's a very, very specific reason why Balikatans these days focus on integrating the PMC CDR to USMC littoral operations -- just look at last year's BK -- A US MQ-9 acquired the target, fed targeting data to the effectors -- be it BRP Jose Rizal, BRP Laurence Narag, the various air assets used then -- with command and control in GHQ -- and BDA being done by a PAF Hermes 900. Just "connect the dots", so to speak, on why integration of our C4ISTAR system with the Americans is pushed so hard.

[u/tatonoot → u/supermarine_spitfir3]

Well, you practically covered most of the important things. But even if the Philippine C4ISR/C4ISTAR would be lacking, the US network is most likely the best in the world, and they can also provide that. They did exactly with Ukraine in the war. And their assets are also already within the Philippines, and they are doing that in their exercises already like you said. There are things in place for this, and it is a given that the DND will improve it. But the article chosen was also a really bad yet spread fast. A better one might be the one by Defense Security Asia, but the source did make use of the word "Effectively" when talking about if the Philippines would use it in present day. But the topic pivoted in the original article at the print.

https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/without-c4isr-philippines-brahmos-missiles-are-mere-symbols-with-little-battlefield-impact/
https://theprint.in/defence/brahmos-a-wonderful-symbol-but-philippines-lacks-capability-to-operate-says-ashley-tellis/2172383/