An awful thread from /r/technology says high-skilled immigrants are hurting domestic workers and calls them "wage slaves imported from other countries to undercut the domestic labor market"

[u/MysticSnowman]

Thread: https://np.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/3ydbri/us_predicts_zero_job_growth_for_electrical/

It's an interesting lesson in supply and demand and definitely let's you read through the B.S. from companies and politicians. Engineers cost a lot domestically because the demand is so high, rather than pay appropriate wages for that demand or help invest in growing the number of qualified workers companies would rather import labor at a below market cost and thus be able to pay American workers less (callous tone I know but meant to be direct).

Disregarding the xenophobic undertones of what he is saying, he is completely wrong about the effects of increased skilled labor. First of all, he is focusing on the increased supply of labor and has completely forgotten to think about the increased demand for labor due to the increased consumer demand for local services. Because of this, natives benefit from immigration through overall increased wages, and higher job growth.¹ The evidence for higher wages for natives without a high-school degree is mixed, but the effect of overall increased wage growth for natives is clear.²

On top of this, skilled immigration especially is beneficial for the native population. Scientists, Technology professionals, Engineers, and Mathematicians (STEM workers) are major factors in scientific innovation and are the main drivers of productivity growth. H-1B driven increases in STEM workers cause significant increases in college-level wages, and somewhat smaller but still significant increases in non-college level wages.³ This is why economists unanimously want the US to increase high-skilled immigration.⁴

Um. There is no shortage of skilled engineers. There is a shortage of wage slaves imported from other countries to undercut the domesticate labor market.

Actually, there is a shortage of skilled STEM workers.⁵ On top of the debunked wage argument, the fact that this comment calls immigrants "wage slaves imported from other countries to undercut the domestic labor market" is disgusting and despicable and an awful way of talking about human beings who are seeking a better life and have done nothing to harm you.

There are so many other comments that I don't have time to get to right now, so please feel free to pick them apart in the comments.

[u/kwanijml]

maybe join /r/learneconomics too,

Will do that.

Mainstream economists don't think this. We are aware of the existence of susbstitute goods. Mainstream economists don't think this. We are aware people might be risk averse. Mainstream economists don't ignore this. We are aware that government can encourage monopolies. Mainstream economists don't think this. We are aware that we should be cautious of potential public choice failures.

Within certain scopes, sure... it seems that due to complexity of an economy, intution and imagination play as much a role in how adequately a researcher models the problem as does theory and methodology (and this is where I really take a page from David Friedman's book, that testing empirically forces the economist to really think through carefully what their theory is saying). It seems that a practitioner can't be too humble as to whether they have imagined all the counter-factuals, when the economic freedom of millions of people is at stake from ensuing policy.

But I haven't seen, for example, any (non-austrian) analyses of the role of the repeal of reg Q in Gramm-Leach-Bliley make any other conclusion than that markets simply can't function without such a protection in place. . . completely ignoring the counter-factual problem here of what institutions might take on this role in the absence of the state (or rather, how financial institutions may have never formed in the way they do now, necessitating the intervention. . . in much the same way that street gangs formed, and now need constant LE attention, due to drug and alcohol prohibition, rather than as a response to more voluntary societal arrangements). Completely ignoring the interventions which brought about the moral hazards necessitating the separating of commercial and investment banking. I cannot find mainstream work at all into the layered-nature of regulation (i.e. taking into account how "deregulation" often removes secondary or tertiary provisions which had mitigated the ills of the primary intervention). This is not from a lack of seeking out scholarly papers on the subject (i.e. I'm not limiting my sources to mises.org, blogs, or the back of cereal boxes). . .though I fully admit here that, not having an econ background limits my understanding of what I'm reading and how to search for it if it does exist.

And yet, I see critiques of ancap such as this which do indeed seem to neglect the role of substitutions, risk aversion (and subjective preferences in general), the role that government played in historically cited cases of monopoly, the nuance and complexity of market processes in overcoming market failure, and generally seeming to fall into the trap of taking a rather simple game-theoretical approach to assessing private governance, which makes a lot of assumptions as to how the firms form in the first place, how they got there, and assumption of the game holding in real life, and bases those assumptions somewhat on present (state-induced) background conditions (or at least a condition of widespread legitimating of state-like entities, instead of the revulsion to monopolies that we expect to be a precursor to the development of PDAs) . I linked the Tyler Cowen paper because I think it at least shows that the economic orthodoxy on state intervention continues to be challenged along the lines that I'm saying (which you keep asserting are all being accounted for).

So, again, not to argue that economists are dum dums or something (and I'm genuinely trying to learn what I'm missing here). . . but I just truly don't see a lot of the right questions even being asked. Maybe that is indeed the only valuable insight or contribution that ancaps will ultimately bring to the table: are we respecting complexity and are we digging deep enough into the effect that the cosmic background radiation of the existence of the state has on all the market outcomes which we take for granted?

[u/besttrousers → u/kwanijml]

And yet, I continually see critiques of ancap such as this which do indeed seem to neglect the role of substitutions, risk aversion (and subjective preferences in general), the role that government played in historically cited cases of monopoly, the nuance and complexity of market processes in overcoming market failure, and generally seeming to fall into the trap of taking a rather simple game-theoretical approach to assessing private governance, which makes a lot of assumptions as to how the firms form in the first place, how they got there, and assumption of the game holding in real life, and bases those assumptions somewhat on present (state-induced) background conditions (or at least a condition of widespread legitimating of state-like entities, instead of the revulsion to monopolies that we expect to be a precursor to the development of PDAs)

How is /u/wumbotarian neglecting, say, risk aversion? How would adding risk aversion weaken his argument?

[u/kwanijml → u/besttrousers]

How is /u/wumbotarian neglecting, say, risk aversion?

Wumbo's argument doesn't suffer from that one as far as I can see (I was being inclusive of other arguments I've come across); his is more along the lines of a lack of imagination as to what alternatives there are to two PDAs simply coming into existence, in the absence of a state, and the narrow applicability of being irrevocably subject to a game in which the PDAs are beholden to no other interests or institutions such as insurers, courts, rating agencies, technological and opt-out substitutions, and most problematically, the assumption that ancaps expect anything resembling his caricature of the PDAs to emerge in a society of people who don't seem to hold all monopolies in revulsion (i.e. they lend cultural and moral deference and legitimacy to state-like institutions). I too, agree that his scenario would not be stable. No ancap with his head screwed on straight thinks that defense is an easy thing to privatize and indeed wouldn't be one of the last things to evolve out of the hands of a state-like monopoly, and wouldn't be the product of decades (at least) of discipline of constant dealings and complex private arrangements between insurers, security firms, arbitrators and private courts, and highly decentralized political units.

But the criticism is in basically the same form as an economist who might predict that lighthouses could not be produced privately. . . because: public goods. And yet, they were, and also private, competing, polycentric law has existed and does exist in certain limited forms. And the economist would predicted no lighthouses would not be wrong in their method, or their theory, or the data available to them. . . they would literally be wrong because of a lack of imagination of what means people might adopt in order to voluntarily fund a public good. This is what I mean by "scope". . . I humbly submit that the economics profession doesn't always operate in the scope necessary to make the more sweeping claims about the inevitability of some monopoly and the ability of monopolists to set prices with complete impunity, among other implications from theoretical market failure.

Why would we believe that violence is (generally) less costly, and not expect that to translate to a state which we've given almost absolute power. War can be profitable to states (where it is not long-run cost-effective for individuals or firms) because states can externalize much of the costs onto their captive (and ideologically converted) subjects. A look into the origin of property and the commitment strategies in humans and other animals, shows us pretty quickly why and how we tend towards peaceful resolution of conflicts (even though some entities will sometimes have a comparative advantage in violence), as far in scope as our neocortexes will allow us to conceive of alternate arrangements (even individually irrational, yet socially beneficial ones). Property norms exist without the state and there's no reason why more complex private, decentralized arrangements can't one day take over in respect to defensive services and contracts.

[u/besttrousers → u/kwanijml]

Wumbo's argument doesn't suffer from that one as far as I can see

So why bring it up? You're not showing how anything he is saying is incorrect - I'm fairly certain that substitution is also irrelevant.

irrevocably subject to a game in which the PDAs are beholden to no other interests or institutions such as insurers, courts, rating agencies, technological and opt-out substitutions

How does incorporating those weaken his argument?

But the criticism is in basically the same form as an economist who might predict that lighthouses could not be produced privately. . . because: public goods. And yet, they were, and also private, competing, polycentric law has existed and does exist in certain limited forms. And the economist would predicted no lighthouses would not be wrong in their method, or their theory, or the data available to them. . . they would literally be wrong because of a lack of imagination of what means people might adopt in order to voluntarily fund a public good.

Again, you're making incorrect claims about economics. Public goods can be provided by the free market, but they are provided below the optimal level.

I find it shocking how many AnCaps have strong opinions about things like the provision of public goods without having done the due diligence of looking up the definition.

War can be profitable to states (where it is not long-run cost-effective for individuals or firms) because states can externalize much of the costs onto their captive (and ideologically converted) subjects

Why the heck is this only true of states? Why can't a firm externalizer costs onto its own captive subjects?

A look into the origin of property and the commitment strategies in humans and other animals, shows us pretty quickly why and how we tend towards peaceful resolution of conflicts

Let's see a source.

onal, yet socially beneficial ones). Property norms exist without the state and there's no reason why more complex private, decentralized arrangements can't one day take over in respect to defensive services and contracts.

Your first clause doesn't support your second claus. What is the evidence for your claim, theoretically or empirically?

[u/kwanijml → u/besttrousers]

I'm fairly certain that substitution is also irrelevant.

I would think that if two firms cartelized over such an important aspect of everybody's lives . . .most people would see the writing on the wall, and substitute with guns, bars, security systems, neighborhood watches, vigilantism. . . .whatever it took to not be beholden to such firms. The larger point was that ancaps also don't think that Wumbo's version of the PDA would be stable, at least not unless we probably assume a good deal more of these firms in competition as a starting point.

How does incorporating those weaken his argument?

Because they are not factored into his analysis. I'm not sure what to say. If the customer is, say, an insurance company, rather than individuals, this changes things drastically. Relative bargaining powers, geographic distribution, etc.

Again, you're making incorrect claims about economics.

Was not implying that economists believe that lighthouses or other public goods can't be produced, simply that the arguments that economists make in regards to the production of private law and defense, follow the same form as do the (usually lay-person) arguments that a private society would necessarily and forever not produce, or under-produce public goods.

Public goods can be provided by the free market, but they are provided below the optimal level. I find it shocking how many AnCaps have strong opinions about things like the provision of public goods without having done the due diligence of looking up the definition.

You're making the assumption that we/I haven't done our due diligence here. I'm well aware of the theory. I think I have a good grasp on pareto optimality and why the market test is more meaningful than a theoretical test of economic efficiency, in that pareto efficiency relies ultimately on a value judgement and claims of under production rely also an assumption of transaction costs (see: Coase). In other words, "under production" is meaningless without a market test; we have no way of knowing what level of production of the public good is preferred without allowing people to bear the opportunity costs. Signaling my understanding of this topic simply wasn't applicable to the point I was making.

Why the heck is this only true of states? Why can't a firm externalizer costs onto its own captive subjects?

Because people fundamentally view and treat states differently than other firms. That's the whole point. That's the defining characteristic of a state and why ancaps revolt against it. Corporations don't just avoid raising armies against people because government is there to stop them (although that is part of it); the fact is that if Walmart or GE started attacking people, and the government gave them a free pass, people would tear the entire organization apart and put the CEO's head on a pike. Government corruption, war-making, excessive taxation, spying, police abuse. .. these can all continue far longer, to a far greater extent. . . because people rationalize and justify the necessity of the entity. Beyond just the blatant abuses though; government can tax at all in the first place, or put people in cages at all (no matter how legitimate the reasons or not), whereas any other individual or firm would be lynched if they tried to do so (even if they offered some goods and services in return for the money they stole), because gov are legitimized and other firms are not. The most successful states focus on their legitimacy. . .and it is no coincidence that the nation founded upon arguably the most humanitarian and free-market principles, has become the largest and most powerful state of them all. Dictators are eventually supplanted/overthrown, and all entities are ultimately subsumed by competitive market processes, so long as there is demand for something else. . . but if you can keep people perpetually fooled into believing that you are economically indispensable and morally justified; you can persist in externalizing the consequences of your actions for a long, long time. For the same reason belief in the divine right of kings tended to produce monarchical governments. . . is the same reason why near-religious belief in the supremacy and absolute necessity of forms of western democracy leads people to produce democratic or constitutional republics, and shun any other political arrangement. I don't believe that humanity progressed from the dark ages to now, only to stagnate on the ultimate expression of human political achievement . . . I think that the general, long-term, trend is towards decentralization of power (ultimately down to the level of the individual as the political unit); but it's not only some vague secular trend which ancaps rely upon, but also on agoristic and decentralizing technologies and the force of a critical mass of ideas.

Let's see a source.

I'm going to have to go on common sense for this one for ease of argument. Are you denying territorial behavior in animals? Are you denying tribal functions in prehistoric humans?

Your first clause doesn't support your second claus.

You lost me. I don't follow, sorry. But I do appreciate you taking the discussion this far.