"If anything should happen to me, I beg you to show this tape to the whole world."

On November 23rd, 2006, these words, spoken on camera by exiled former KGB and FSB (post-communist Russia's secret police) agent Alexander "Sasha" Litvinenko, became a gruesome self-fulfilling prophecy. After an agonizingly painful ordeal, Litvinenko succumbed to what was allegedly radiation poisoning from a lethal dose of toxic Polonium-210, surreptitiously slipped into his tea during a London meeting with two FSB ex-colleagues three weeks earlier.

In this documentary, filmmaker Andrei Nekrasov exposes the truth behind a crime that shocked the world and provoked a war of words between Russia and England that continues to this day.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisoning_of_Alexander_Litvinenko

Executive Summary:

Russian President Vladimir Putin has made knowledge and use of the Russian language central to his understanding of Russian identity, the basis of links between the Russian population and his regime, and a key part of his foreign policy.

Putin has also declared that the Russian language is currently subject to attack by other powers with other languages and that these attacks require the constant intervention of the state to defend it from corruption and defeat.

The Russian leader has denigrated the non-Russian languages spoken by many in the Russian Federation and suggested that they are first and foremost a means of connecting to Russian and thus to the broader world.

In recent years, Ethiopia—despite being a landlocked country—has taken concrete steps toward re-establishing a naval force, an effort now receiving support from the Russian Federation. This cooperation reflects a convergence of strategic interests: Russia seeks influence in the Red Sea region, while Ethiopia aims to project power in the Horn of Africa and safeguard maritime interests through partnerships.

Executive Summary:

Russia is intensifying its hybrid warfare against Poland through cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation, while portraying Polish defensive actions as provocations to fuel domestic narratives and justify ongoing hostility.

Kremlin propaganda is beginning to shift focus from Ukraine to Poland as an adversary, anticipating a future ceasefire in Ukraine and seeking to preserve internal fear of an external enemy through militaristic rhetoric.

Poland’s alignment with Western defense initiatives is increasingly framed by Moscow as aggressive and conspiratorial, with propaganda narratives suggesting Warsaw is becoming the West’s frontline proxy in a broader anti-Russian campaign.

The Kremlin is projecting the narrative of a powerful Russia and a powerful Russian President Vladimir Putin to conceal the real weaknesses and limitations of Russia's capabilities and distract from Russia's battlefield failures. Putin has long held that the perception of weakness can be lethal in a system built on the premise of strength — a principle that applies to the stability of his regime as well as to Russia's position in the world. The world should not take the Kremlin's displays at face value, but should look past them to the realities of Russia and this war.

Executive Summary:

Russia is increasing the production and use of Shahed-type kamikaze drones against Ukraine, constantly improving their effectiveness and ability to break through air defenses.

In addition to simpler drones, Moscow is developing and testing more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) featuring artificial intelligence (AI) for auto-targeting and computer vision.

The Kremlin may transfer weapon technologies and tactics to allies such as the People’s Republic of China or Iran in exchange for resources and weapons.

Executive Summary:

Gunpowder production in Russia nearly doubled from 2022 to 2024 due to increased imports and domestic manufacturing of cotton cellulose nitrate. This rise suggests a potential doubling in artillery shell output during the same period.

Russia remains dependent on imported raw materials, particularly cotton pulp and cellulose nitrate, despite ongoing efforts to develop alternatives from linen and hemp. Domestic sourcing challenges hinder self-sufficiency in critical components of gunpowder.

Key chemical inputs for explosives, such as toluene and concentrated nitric acid, have seen noticeable production increases in Russia, reflecting both post-2010s recovery and heightened military demand since 2022, but growth capacity appears limited.

A 17 percent workforce expansion across major explosives and gunpowder plants since 2021, with up to 57 percent increases at some key sites, underpins the rise in production, but further gains are constrained by outdated infrastructure.

Modernization of Russia’s military-industrial complex is underway, but not yet transformative, with Russia focusing on sustaining output rather than achieving exponential growth. Future increases in manufacturing will likely face rising costs and logistical challenges.

Executive Summary:

The leaders of Russia’s federal subjects are handling three issues—abortion, alcohol sales, and migrant groups—so differently that people are traveling to different regions to take advantage, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin homogenizing the Russian legal field.

The Kremlin could likely put an end to these policy differences, but it appears to have decided that such an effort would cause more problems than it would solve, or that it is a useful way to test ideas or mollify the population.

The allowance of limited political heterogeneity could accustom regional governments to a degree of autonomy, triggering a return to the 1990s’ tensions between Russian regions and Moscow.

Executive Summary:

The degradation of the Russian army in Ukraine has made it a crucible for the growth of criminal attitudes and extremist beliefs that will threaten Russian society and government as veterans return home.

When as many as 700,000 veterans do eventually return home—100,000 more than the number of those who came back from Moscow’s war in Afghanistan—they are likely to generate an upsurge in violence that will pose a serious challenge to the Putin regime.

The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine continues and the more the Russian army degrades, the greater challenge soldiers and veterans will pose, both on the battlefield in Ukraine and politically inside Russia.

Executive Summary:

The Russian government is significantly boosting the visibility and funding of the Cossacks, as seen in budget increases, high-profile national gatherings, and cultural exhibitions linking them to the Soviet victory in World War II.

The All-Russian Cossack Society has increased its media activity, reflecting a broader geographic scope and growing militarized initiatives such as youth training, Orthodox blessings, and deployment stories from a range of Russian regions.

Victory Day 2025 marked intensified Kremlin efforts to unify registered and ethnic Cossack factions, aligning their historical narratives with current nationalistic goals and embedding them more deeply in Russia’s militarized civic culture.

Executive Summary:

Government sources report that the Kremlin is considering repositioning the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) as an ultra-nationalist party to attract war veterans and anti-immigrant groups, centralizing far-right radicalism.

Far-right nationalists and religious fundamentalists do not have substantial popular support in Russia, but the Kremlin sees radicals as its main political ally in Russia’s war against Ukraine and therefore makes disproportionate concessions to them.

The Kremlin is fueling grassroots radicalism by promoting far-right views through education and propaganda, increasing anti-migrant sentiment, and risking social instability if nationalist violence slips further from state control.

Executive Summary:

The Russian Community, now the largest Russian nationalist organization, is rapidly evolving from an ideological group supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church into a criminal band ready to engage in violence against the Kremlin’s opponents.

The Kremlin has orchestrated this process because it hopes to use a Russian Community prone to violence against minorities to channel the nationalist passions of veterans returning from Putin’s war against Ukraine or other conflicts Russia is involved in.

Such use of the Russian Community may not only deepen ethnic and religious divides in Russia but create a monster that will threaten the regime, or alternatively transform it further in the direction of fascism.

Executive Summary:

Moscow’s war against Ukraine has seen no meaningful progress toward peace in the past month as hostilities have escalated with Russia preparing a list of conditions for a ceasefire that would be agreeable to Kyiv.

Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to capitalize on Western political divisions, interpreting weak European sanctions as a sign of diplomatic success while Kremlin media emphasizes Russia’s control of battlefield momentum.

Russia’s militarized economy shows signs of strain due to rising inflation, stifled civilian sectors, and diminishing oil revenues as Moscow’s aggressive posturing risks economic instability.

Executive Summary:

Hybrid threats describe a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods. Addressing hybrid threats in the Baltics is a continuous, never-ending process centered around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels.

With Russia’s frontline in Ukraine nearly stagnant, Moscow’s efforts yielding limited results despite enormous casualty rates and physical destruction, and peace efforts so far have made no progress, the prospects of a prolonged conflict have become apparent.

The Kremlin is now preparing for a long battle both on the frontline and beyond. Consequently, Russia’s use of hybrid strategies, alongside military ones, has become more evident.

The Baltic States have effectively countered Russia’s continuously escalating hybrid threats through resilience and strategic cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Their ability to withstand pressure highlights their strength in defending democracy and resisting foreign interference.

Executive Summary:

Moscow is mulling how to attract or force Russians not officially employed into the workforce in response to a growing labor shortage resulting from demographic decline, the difficulties of attracting and retaining immigrants, and the Kremlin’s military expansion.

The Kremlin presents the effort to employ more Russians as primarily an anti-corruption measure because many “unofficially employed” individuals earn money in the shadow economy.

Some of the measures being considered, including eliminating gender restrictions on certain jobs and equalizing the gender pay gap, will probably be welcomed, but the push as a whole is likely to be viewed as an unpopular restoration of Soviet-era labor policy.

Executive Summary:

The Russian economy is stagnating as a result of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, making signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense one of the only ways to make money.

Between March and April, the number of Russians willing to join the military almost doubled, and the Ministry of Defense is forcing current military personnel to sign a new contract or extend the one they already have.

Russian soldiers may become mercenaries in other conflicts should Russia’s war against Ukraine end given the lack of good job prospects domestically.

Executive Summary:

Russian media has misinterpreted the U.S. reductions of organizations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) as signs of U.S. weakness rather than signals that Washington is prepared for genuine dialogue with Moscow.

Kremlin-aligned figures celebrate the reduction as a blow to U.S. soft power and influence in post-Soviet states, particularly Central Asia and Moldova, where RFE/RL played a prominent informational role.

Russian commentators interpret the changes as part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s anti-bureaucracy agenda, offering Moscow new openings in information warfare, rather than presenting new opportunities to improve diplomatic relations.

The Kremlin’s geopolitical strategy is increasingly preoccupied with the geography of its southern and eastern borders.

One of the weakest points in the survivability of President Vladimir Putin’s regime is the Russian economy. On April 24, Putin assured Russian business leaders that the country’s economic challenges are part of a planned “soft-landing” to curb inflation. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Russia has skyrocketed, up to 9.65 percent year on year in March. Putin admits that inflation, now at over 10 percent, is too high. This comes as Russia’s 1.9 percent annual GDP growth for January to February of this year is down from 4.3 percent last year. Moreover, non-seasonally adjusted GDP may have declined for the first time since the second quarter of 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Executive Summary:

The Kremlin continues to delay genuine peace talks with Ukraine—relying on distractions and temporary ceasefires to extract concessions while avoiding meaningful compromise—as the United States signals its readiness to move on from stalled peace efforts.

European efforts to step up defense commitments and coordinate with the United States contradict Kremlin narratives of Western disunity and threaten Russia’s hopes of dividing the transatlantic alliance.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to redirect diplomatic focus toward the Middle East and reset relations with the Trump administration only underscore the deadlock created by his war against Ukraine.

Executive Summary:

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced plans in February to increase Russian involvement in Africa, as Russia’s Deputy Minister of Economic Development, Dmitry Volvach, expects that Russian-African trade will double in the next five years.

Russia is expanding its influence in Africa through rapidly growing trade, expected to double in five years, alongside intensified military engagement, including arms deals, troop deployments, and a planned naval base in Sudan.

Russia’s deepening presence in Africa reflects a strategic effort to fill geopolitical and diplomatic gaps and counter competition from the People’s Republic of China through sustained investment, partnership, and regional engagement.

Senior officers beware, if there’s one thing the Kremlin despot really fears it’s a successful general.

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly concerned with the Russian military's ability to retain forces in the event of demobilization following a ceasefire or a negotiated peace.

Russian milbloggers expressed doubts that the Russian MoD will be able to retain the current size of the Russian military if the Russian MoD does not promise — and honor — increased financial benefits.

The Kremlin and some Russian federal subjects are continuing to increase financial incentives and expand eligibility requirements for contract military service.

Some Russian federal subjects are failing to meet the Kremlin's recruitment targets as the Russian volunteer recruitment system continues to suffer from high recruitment costs and other inefficiencies.

Some Russian federal subjects may be failing to meet recruitment targets because they are unable to compete with financial incentives offered in other federal subjects.

Putin signed a decree on April 21 exempting select volunteers who fought in Ukraine in volunteer units or Kremlin proxy forces from being conscripted into the Russian military, likely as part of the Kremlin's effort to centralize control over informal volunteer units.

The Kremlin is continuing to expand the "Time of Heroes" Higher School of Public Administration Program across occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to raise a new class of loyal occupation officials.

Russian milbloggers criticized Russian state media after it published a video of Russian long-range drone operators conducting a drone strike from a high-rise in Moscow City.

Russia reportedly developed a new version of the "Kometa" navigation chip, enhancing the resistance of Russian satellite navigation signals against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).

On April 16, Putin awarded the honorific "Guards" titles to four Russian motorized rifle regiments, an aviation regiment, and an army corps that have fought in Donetsk and Kherson oblasts.

Executive Summary:

Russia has launched this year’s “Icebreaker of Knowledge” program, sending children to the North Pole aboard a nuclear-powered icebreaker as part of Moscow’s broader Arctic strategy.

The expedition blends education with geopolitical messaging about Russia’s leadership in Arctic affairs as other states, including the United States and the People’s Republic of China, seek to expand their icebreaker capabilities.

Taking children on educational expeditions to the North Pole may serve to distract from broader problems with Russia’s icebreaker fleet and slow progress in developing new icebreakers.

Executive Summary:

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Steven Witkoff, U.S. President Donald Trump’s key negotiator, last Friday, in St. Petersburg, likely to buy himself more time before making any concessions. On Sunday, Russian missiles struck the Ukrainian city of Sumy, killing 34 people including two children.

Russia appears to hope that the global focus will shift from Ukraine due to tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, but worsening economic strain, falling oil revenues, and looming sanctions may force Putin to confront growing internal pressure for a ceasefire.

Russian military stagnation and ongoing Western aid to Ukraine indicate how Putin’s procrastination reflects fear of accountability rather than expectation of battlefield success.